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VIRTUAL ASSETS, REAL TAX: THE CAPITAL GAINS/ORDINARY INCOME DISTINCTION IN 
VIRTUAL WORLDS  
 
Nell A. Beekman1 
 
A great deal of economic activity now occurs in virtual worlds, 
raising questions about the proper taxation of income generated by 
virtual world activity.  This Note focuses on the characterization of 
such income, that is, whether income earned in virtual worlds should 
be classified as ordinary income or capital gains.  Generally, the 
character of income is determined by the activity which generated the 
income.  In the context of virtual worlds, the issue is whether 
character should be determined by the nature of the user's transactions 
within the world. 
 
 As argued below, there is no good conceptual justification for 
treating economic activity in virtual worlds differently from 
analogous activity that occurs in the real world. However, applying 
the capital gains-ordinary income distinction to virtual worlds would 
not be administratively feasible.  Thus, for the reasons set forth in 
this Note, the best possible tax regime is to classify all income 
earned in virtual worlds as ordinary income. 
                                                
1  J.D. 2010, Columbia University School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor Alex 
Raskolnikov and my colleague Kathryn Kelly for their valuable feedback and guidance. 






A vast amount of income-generating activity now occurs in virtual worlds,2 but it 
remains unclear whether, and how, income derived from virtual world activity should be 
taxed.  It has become apparent, however, that this question is no longer merely abstract or 
academic, as its resolution will certainly have real-world consequences.  The U.S. 
government has signaled its interest in the issue,3 and some countries have already 
implemented or proposed tax regimes for virtual world income.4 
 This Note assumes that income generated from virtual world activity can and will 
be taxed and focuses on the question of what the character of that income should be.5  
Under the U.S. tax regime, income is characterized either as ordinary income or capital 
gains, and the category is determined by the activity that generated the income.  Capital 
gains arise from the sale or exchange of capital assets as defined by § 1221 of the tax 
code while ordinary income derives from all other activity.  The capital-ordinary 
                                                
2  A virtual world is a persistent online environment in which users create and control 
characters (called “avatars”).  The avatars move through the virtual world, interacting with other 
avatars, and with the virtual world itself.  Adam S. Chodorow, Ability to Pay and the Taxation of 
Virtual Income, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 695, 699 (2008).  For a more detailed discussion of virtual 
worlds, see infra Part II.  In his 2001 study of one virtual world, EverQuest, economist Edward 
Castronova found that “[t]he nominal hourly wage is about USD 3.42 per hour, and the labors of 
the people produce a GNP per capita somewhere between that of Russia and Bulgaria.”  Edward 
Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the Cyberian 
Frontier (CESifo, Working Paper No. 618, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828.  A more current estimate places the 
yearly aggregate value of virtual world transactions at $2.09 billion. David J. Mack, ITax: An 
Analysis of the Laws and Policies Behind the Taxation of Property Transactions in a Virtual 
World, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 749, 749 (2008). 
3 Nina Olson, Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2008 Annual Report to Congress 213-26 (2008), 
available at  http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_arc_intro_toc_msp.pdf (identifying taxation of 
virtual worlds as one of the 20 most serious problems encountered by taxpayers and 
recommending that the I.R.S. “[w]ork with the Office of Chief Counsel and the Treasury 
Department to issue guidance addressing how taxpayers should report economic activities in 
virtual worlds”).  However, since then, the I.R.S. has taken no action on this issue. Adam 
Chodorow, Tracing Basis Through Virtual Spaces, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 283, 291-92 (2010). 
4  See Chodorow, supra note 3, at 291 (describing efforts in Australia and Sweden to tax 
virtual world income); Flora Graham, Slapping a Tax on Playtime, BBC News, Nov. 28, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7746094.stm (last visited June 23, 2009). 
5  While it may seem premature to discuss the character of income derived from virtual 
world activity before the question of character has been officially raised, the issue is one that will 
predictably have to be addressed.  See Julian Dibbell, Play Money: Or How I Quit My Day Job 
and Made Millions Trading Virtual Loot 305 (2006) (describing a conversation between the 
author and an I.R.S. agent in which the agent wonders whether the sale of virtual goods would be 
analogous to selling a collectible, which is a category of capital asset). 
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distinction is important because capital gains are generally taxed at a lower rate than 
ordinary income.  This Note questions whether the capital-ordinary distinction should be 
imported to the virtual world context, that is, whether the nature of the activity that 
occurs within the virtual world (“in-world” activity) should determine the character of the 
income generated by that activity.   
 To some extent, the answer depends on how we conceive of virtual worlds in 
relation to the real world—whether virtual worlds are games somehow isolated from the 
real world, or if they are merely another arena in which economic transactions occur that 
are no more or less real than any other transactions.  Ultimately, I will argue that while 
there is no good conceptual justification for treating virtual world activity differently 
from real world activity for tax purposes, the capital-ordinary distinction would not be 
administratively feasible if applied to in-world activity. 
 The first part of this Note provides background information on the definition of 
virtual worlds, the different types of virtual worlds, and the economic activities that occur 
therein.  The second part discusses tax law and the capital gains ordinary income 
distinction as it is currently applied to real world activity.  The third part analyzes the 
application of tax law to virtual worlds. 
 
 
II. VIRTUAL WORLDS 
 
 This Part provides background information on virtual worlds.  Part II.1 defines 
and describes virtual worlds, and Part II.2 discusses the different types of virtual worlds.  
Finally, Part II.3 provides a brief description of the various types of economic activities 
that occur in virtual worlds. 
 
 
A. Definition of Virtual Worlds 
   
 The term “virtual worlds” can be unclear because it is not always used in a 
consistent manner.6  As referred to in this Note, “virtual worlds” are simulated graphical 
environments which have the following characteristics: 1) interactivity—a large number 
of people can access the program simultaneously and interact with each other and with 
the world; 2) physicality—the user experiences the world as a “first-person physical 
environment on their computer screen”; and 3) persistence—when users are not present 
in the world, the world continues in their absence.7 
 Users in virtual worlds create characters, called “avatars,” through which they 
interact with the virtual world.  The avatars are often highly customizable, although the 
extent of customization varies from world to world.8  Virtual worlds also contain a 
                                                
6  M. Scott Boone, Ubiquitous Computing, Virtual Worlds, and the Displacement of 
Property Rights, 4 I/S: J. L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 91, 109-10 (2008). 
7  Castronova, supra note 2, at 6. 
8  Boone, supra note 6, at 112.  
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multitude of virtual objects which may be almost anything:  a house, clothing, weapons, 
raw materials such as iron ore, etc.9  These objects may be user-created or created and 
placed in the world by the game designers.10 
 
 
B. Types of Virtual Worlds 
 
 There are two archetypal forms of virtual worlds, “structured” and 
“unstructured,”11 and while most worlds fall somewhere in between, they are still 
ordinarily recognizable as belonging to one of these two categories.  Currently, the most 
popular virtual worlds are structured.12  A structured world “presents its users with pre-set 
roles and pre-set challenges and objectives” while an unstructured world “has few rules, 
no objectives, and no pre-set roles.”13   
 Second Life is currently one of the most popular and well known of the 
unstructured worlds.14  The avatars created by users all start out on a equal footing and 
may engage in any activity which Second Life offers—e.g., socializing with other 
avatars, wandering through virtual landscapes, building (or buying and selling) virtual 
items, and so on.15  While individual users may set goals for themselves, there are no 
goals inherent to the world and no objective standard for determining which avatars are 
better or more successful than others.16  Second Life allows users a great deal of freedom 
                                                
9  Id. 
10  Id. at 113. 
11  This is the terminology used by Bryan T. Camp. Bryan T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A 
Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 Hastings L.J. 1, 4 (2007).  Leandra Lederman uses the terms 
“game worlds” and “unscripted worlds.”  Leandra Lederman, Stranger Than Fiction: Taxing 
Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1620, 1628-30 (2007).  These terms refer to the same 
distinction. 
12  Boone, supra note 6, at 111 (“The most successful incarnations of virtual worlds 
currently are . . . structured worlds.”). 
13  Camp, supra note 11, at 4. 
14  In 2008, users in Second Life were spending more than 20 million dollars in the world 
each month. Philip Stoup, The Development and Failure of Social Norms in Second Life, 58 Duke 
L.J. 311, 342 (2008).   
15  Users of structured worlds are usually called “players” while users of unstructured 
worlds—Second Life in particular—are usually referred to as “residents.”  To simplify matters, I 
refer to them all as “users.” 
16  Although it is true that, just as in the real world, users are consumers in Second Life, and 
to some extent an avatar's “status” is connected to the number and quality of its in-world 
belongings.  While this may be a social reality of the world, I would nevertheless argue that the 
acquisition of virtual items is not a preordained goal of the world. 
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in creating virtual objects, and the vast majority of the world is user-created.17 
 In contrast, World of Warcraft (“WoW”) is a popular structured virtual world in 
which users choose an avatar of a particular “race” (humans, trolls, orcs, etc.) and 
particular profession, which comes with certain preset traits, abilities, and limitations.18  
Users go on “quests” for the purposes of gaining skills and experience (this is known as 
“leveling,” i.e., achieving a higher level) or acquiring treasure.19  Thus, while the users 
have a certain amount of freedom in what they do, how they behave, and whom they 




C. Economic Activities in Virtual Worlds 
 
 While most virtual world transactions involve small sums of money, the aggregate 
value of economic activity in virtual worlds is significant.21  There are a variety of 
economic activities available to users in virtual worlds, though they are not all possible in 
every world.  The activities I discuss here fall into five categories: 1) creation of virtual 
items, 2) acquisition of virtual world items, 3) buying and selling virtual assets for real 
world money, 4) exchange of in-world services for virtual world or real world money, and 
5) other miscellaneous economic activities. 
 
 
1.    Creation of Virtual World Assets 
 
 In Second Life, users can create almost anything they want using “prims” (short 
for “primitives”) which are the basic building blocks of the world.22  Unlike most virtual 
worlds, Second Life allows its users to retain intellectual property rights in their 
creations.23  In structured worlds, the ability to create new objects tends to be highly 
                                                
17  Boone, supra note 6, at 112. 
18  Camp, supra note 11, at 4. 
19  Id. at 4-5. 
20  For a more detailed discussion of the differences between structured and unstructured 
worlds see id. at 4-8. 
21  Erica Naone, Linden Lab’s CFO Explains How the Economy Works in the Virtual 
Community, Tech. Rev., Aug. 14, 2007, 
http://www.technologyreview.com/business/19242/page1/. 
22  Camp, supra note 11, at 7. 
23  Second Life, Terms of Service, Section 3.2, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php 
(“[Y]ou will retain any and all applicable copyright and other intellectual property rights with 
respect to any Content you create using the Service, to the extent you have such rights under 
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constrained.  For example, if one wishes to create a potion, there are certain ingredients 
that must be obtained (by, for example, foraging) and specific steps that must be 
followed.24  Even though the avatar “makes” the potion, the graphic that represents the 
potion will be a pre-existing, standard game object created by the game designers.25  
Generally, in structured worlds, users are not able to design and build completely new 
items from scratch as they can in Second Life.26 
 
 
2.   In-World Acquisition of Virtual World Items 
 
 There are a number of ways in which users can obtain virtual world items that 
they did not create themselves.  In structured worlds, certain items are made freely 
available to be “gathered” by avatars, while other more valuable items are acquired only 
on completion of certain tasks, such as killing a monster—this is commonly referred to as 
a “loot drop.”27  In all worlds, there are items that can be bought and sold for in-world 
currency or exchanged for other items, but the ability to sell or otherwise transfer items is 
often far more limited in structured worlds than in unstructured worlds.  For example, in 
structured worlds, only avatars that have achieved a certain level may hold certain 
items.28  There are also many items that simply cannot be transferred from one player to 
another under any circumstances.29  In unstructured worlds, however, there are few 
limitations on the transfer of virtual objects, and, if there are restrictions, they are usually 
set by the creator of the object.30 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
applicable law.”) (last visited June 23, 2009).  Compare There Member Agreement, Section 2, 
http://www.there.com/tos.html (“As part of your interactions with the There Environment, you 
may acquire, create, design or modify There Objects, but you agree that you will not gain any 
ownership interest whatsoever in any There Objects or There Environment, and you hereby 
assign to Company all of your rights, title and interest in any such There Objects.”) (last visited 
June 23, 2009). 
24  Camp, supra note 11, at 10. 
25  Id. at 5. 
26  Id. 
27  Lederman, supra note 11, at 1628. 
28  See, e.g., World of Warcraft, Item Basics, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/items/basics.html (“Many items have requirements in order 
to use them.  The types of restrictions on items include minimum level, required proficiencies, 
class restrictions, and reputation requirements.”) (last visited June 23, 2009). 
29  In WoW, these items are called “soulbound.”  Id. 
30  Second Life Wiki, Permissions Explained, 
http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Permissions_Explained (last visited June 23, 2009). 
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3.   Real Money Trading (RMT) 
 
 There is a great deal of variation among worlds in terms of what can be bought 
with virtual world currency and how easily the virtual world currency is exchangeable for 
real world currency.  For example, the Second Life currency, called Lindens, is easily 
exchangeable for real currency, which means there is no real difference between paying 
for items with real money and paying for items with Lindens.31  If a user wishes to 
purchase an item in Second Life but her avatar does not have enough Lindens, she can 
exchange dollars for Lindens to purchase the item.  In structured worlds, however, there 
are generally official restrictions on the exchange of real money for virtual money (and 
vice versa) as well as restrictions on what can be purchased with virtual world money.  
Users who play according to the rules of the world and stick to strictly in-world activity 
cannot acquire certain items or a higher level simply by buying them.32   
 These limitations in structured worlds have led to a thriving grey market (called 
“real money trading”) for virtual world items, accounts, and currency.33  Because the 
actions required to level-up are often tedious to perform, some users may prefer to pay 
for an avatar which has already attained a high level.34  One user may invest the time to 
create a high-level avatar that possesses valuable items and then sell the account (or 
certain transferable items from the account, such as a rare sword) to another user.  Since 
this transaction is not permissible in the virtual world, it will occur through specialty 
online retailers or auction websites, and the virtual asset will be paid for with real world 
currency.35  Participating in a virtual world solely to acquire virtual assets for later sale, 
generally through repetitive actions, is known as gold farming.36  Although an individual 
user working alone could conceivably earn a living as a gold farmer, a significant 
proportion of gold farming operations employ other methods to farm gold on a larger 
scale.  These methods include the use of “bots” (computer programs which perform the 
repetitive gold farming actions automatically) or hiring large numbers of workers in other 
countries, where labor costs are lower, to work as gold farmers.37 
                                                
31  Lederman, supra note 11, at 1630. 
32  See, e.g., World of Warcraft, Skills FAQ, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/faq/skills.html (“In order to increase your skill level in a 
profession or secondary skill, you must use it.”) (last visited July 5, 2009). 
33  Camp, supra note 11, at 12-13. 
34  Lederman, supra note 11, at 1628-29. 
35  Id. at 1623. 
36  Anant Raut & J. Benjamin Schrader, “Chinese Goldfarmers Must Die:” Why China 
Should Worry About the Growth of Sinophobia Online, 5 Bus. L. Brief (Am. U.) 17, 18 (2008). 
37  Julian Dibbell, The Life of a Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2007, Section 6 
(Magazine), at 36, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-
t.html. See generally Dibbell, Play Money, supra note 5, at 88-134. 
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 Real money trading is discouraged by most structured virtual worlds and gold 
farming is expressly forbidden by most Terms of Service/End User License Agreements 
(TOS/EULAs).38  Administrators of virtual worlds often actively seek out gold farmers 
and delete their accounts.39  However, this is not universally true and a few structured 
virtual worlds tolerate or even facilitate real money trading.40 
 
 
4.   Exchange of In-world Services for Money 
 
 Many users of Second Life make money by creating and selling items, but there 
are also those who make money thorough the provision of in-world services, for instance 
as sex workers, tour guides, or teachers.41  Payment for services can also occur in 
structured worlds.  For example, an avatar that is unable to cast a particular spell herself 
may pay another avatar to cast it for her or a user may pay another user to take control of 
his account and level up for him.42 
 
 
5.   Other Economic Activities 
 
 Some virtual worlds provide users with opportunities to invest their virtual world 
money.  For example, users of some virtual worlds have the opportunity to invest in 
virtual world companies.  Second Life has user-created virtual stock exchanges in which 
users buy and sell shares of Second Life companies.43  Some virtual worlds also contain 
in-world user-created and user-run banks where avatars may obtain loans or put their 
virtual world money in interest-bearing accounts.44  
 
                                                
38  See, e.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, Section 2B, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (last visited July 5, 2009); EVE Online 
Terms of Service, Section 10, http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/terms.asp (last visited July 5, 2009). 
39  Dibbell, The Life of a Chinese Gold Farmer, supra note 37, at 36. 
40  Id. 
41  See Camp, supra note 11, at 11. 
42  Id. at 45. 
43  Shannon L. Thompson, Securities Regulation in a Virtual World, 16 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 
89, 95 (2009). 
44  Predictably, these banks, lacking regulation, often defraud their depositors or otherwise 
run into difficulties.   See Amanda J. Penick, Legal Recourse When Virtual World Banks Pack Up 
Their Toys and Go Home, 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 233, 237-40 (2008) (describing the downfall of 
Ginko Financial, a Second Life bank); Rob Cox, A Virtual Bank With Real Woes, N.Y. Times, 
June 15, 2009, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/business/15views.html 
(discussing the problems of Ebank, an EVE Online bank). 




III. BASIC TAX LAW 
 
 This Part explains basic principles of tax law, specifically, in Part III.1, the 
definition of gross income and the realization requirement, and, in Part III.2, capital gains 
and the definition of capital assets.  In the present discussion, two sections of the tax code 




A. Income and Realization 
 
 Section 61 defines gross income broadly as “all income from whatever source 
derived.”45  The Supreme Court has interpreted this definition as including “undeniable 
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.”46  There is no requirement that the “accession to wealth” be received in any 
particular form; even goods that are not easily exchangeable fall within the definition of 
income.47  There is no constitutional or statutory restriction on what Congress can choose 
to tax, and economic gain derived from any activity (even illegal) is potentially taxable.48  
 While any economic accession to wealth can be taxed, there is also a requirement 
that the income be “realized.”  The realization requirement is effectively a question of 
timing, i.e., when to tax.  When a taxpayer acquires property that increases in value, the 
wealth of that taxpayer unquestionably increases.  However, simply holding appreciated 
property will typically not result in taxable income until there is a “realization event,” 
such as sale or exchange of the property for materially different property.49  The 
                                                
45  I.R.C. § 61. 
46  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  
47  Treas. Reg. §1.61-1 (2007) (“Gross income includes income realized in any form, 
whether in money, property or services.  Income may be realized, therefore, in the form of 
services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property, as well as in cash.”). 
48  Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430-31 (“But Congress applied no limitations as to the 
source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature.  And the Court has given a 
liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all 
gains except those specifically exempted.”); Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966) (“[T]he 
statute does not concern itself with the lawfulness of the income it taxes.”); see also I.R.S. 
Publication 17 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf, p.95 (“If you steal 
property, you must report its fair market value in your income in the year you steal it unless in the 
same year, you return it to its rightful owner.”). 
49  Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560 (1991).  “Materially different” is 
defined in this case as meaning “legally distinct.” Id. at 565.  See also Rev. Rul. 90-109 (1990) 
(holding that there is realization when the policyholder of a life insurance contract exercised an 
option to change the insured, because this constitutes a “change in the fundamental substance of 
the original contract”). 
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realization requirement was initially considered to have a constitutional basis,50 but later 
cases reduced it to matter of administrative convenience.51   
 
 
B. Capital Gains and Capital Assets 
 
 Characterization of income as capital gain is beneficial to taxpayers because it is 
taxed at a maximum rate of 15%,52 while the highest marginal rate on ordinary income is 
currently 35%.53  For taxpayers in an income bracket taxed at a marginal rate of 15% or 
lower, the rate for capital gains will be the same as, or lower than, the ordinary income 
rate.54  In contrast, characterization of a loss as capital, rather than ordinary, results in an 
unfavorable treatment for the taxpayer.  Capital loss in a given year may only be deducted 
to the extent that the taxpayer has capital gains in that year, or up to $3000, whichever is 
lower, 55 while all ordinary loss is potentially deductible.56  Thus, it is most favorable to 
taxpayers to have their gains characterized as capital and their losses characterized as 
ordinary. 
 Capital assets are defined by § 1221, and capital gain (or loss) is gain (or loss) 
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.57  A capital asset is “property held by the 
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business)”58 as long as it does not 
fall under one of the exceptions enumerated in § 1221.  Two exceptions are germane to 
this discussion.  The first is “property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers 
in the ordinary course of his trade or business.”59  The second exception is “a copyright, a 
                                                
50  Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920). 
51  Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940); Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 565. 
52  I.R.C. § 1(h).  This is actually an oversimplification, as the rules are far more labyrinthine 
than indicated here, but an elaboration of the complexities is unnecessary for this Note.  
53  Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 956-58. 
54  I.R.C. § 1(h).   
55  I.R.C. § 1211. 
56  I.R.C. § 165. 
57  I.R.C. § 1222.  Whether a transaction results in loss or gain is governed by I.R.C. § 1001, 
but the details need not detain us.  Also note that the rate at which capital gain or loss is taxed 
depends on the holding period of the asset, that is, the length of time the taxpayer has held, or is 
deemed to have held, the asset, and specifically whether the holding period is more or less than 
one year.   See, e.g. I.R.C. §§ 1222-1223.  Issues related to holding period are too complex for 
further discussion here. 
58  I.R.C. § 1221(a). 
59  I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1). 
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literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar property” 
when it is held by the taxpayer who created it, or held by a taxpayer who has received the 
property as a gift from the creator or by exchange with the creator.60   
 The distinction between capital gains and ordinary income is, at least in theory, 
based on the distinction between income generated by “investment” and income 
generated by everything else (interest, wages, gambling, etc.).61  The § 1221(a)(1) 
exception excludes gain derived from “business” activities, such as the provision of 
services, as distinguished from gain that results from investment.62  In the context of 
securities trading, § 1221(a)(1) applies to (that is, excludes from capital gains treatment) 
securities held by a dealer who buys and sells on behalf of his clients and thus derives his 
income from commissions rather than fluctuations in the market.63  In the context of real 
estate, § 1221(a)(1) differentiates between those in the “real estate business,” who make 
their living through the subdivision, improvement, and resale of real estate, whose 
income is ordinary, and those who invest in real estate, whose income is capital.64  The 
line that separates investment income from all other income is not always clear, and it can 
be particularly difficult to discern exactly what is covered by the § 1221(a)(1) 
exception.65 
 The existence of the capital gains preference has long been controversial.  It is 
often criticized as problematic and based on weak policy justifications.66  It is 
                                                
60  I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c) (1960). 
61   Peter Miller, The “Capital Asset” Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation: I, 59 
Yale L. J. 837, 838 (1950).  But note that this theoretical distinction does not always hold up in 
practice.  For example, a person who buys a dilapidated building, fixes it up, and then sells it for a 
profit will benefit from capital gains treatment even though the increase in value may be entirely 
attributable to his labor, and not “investment.”  Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage 
to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers With Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1071, 1078-79 (2008) (describing a similar “sweat equity” scenario in which a 
business owner converts labor income to capital gains). 
62  Miller, supra note 61, at 838; Bielfeldt v. Comm'r, 231 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“The standard distinction between a dealer [whose gain/loss will be ordinary based on the § 
1221(a)(1) exception] and a trader [who does not fall under the § 1221(a)(1) exception] is that the 
dealer's income is based on the service he provides in the chain of distribution of the goods he 
buys and resells, rather than on fluctuations in the market value of those goods, while the trader's 
income is based not on any service he provides but rather on, precisely, fluctuations in the market 
value of the securities or other assets that he transacts in.”). 
63  Bielfeldt, 231 F.3d at 1037. 
64  Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).  
65  Id. at 415 (“[T]he nature of the congressional ‘capital asset’ definition and the myriad 
situations to which we must apply that standard make impossible any easy escape from the task 
before us.  No one set of criteria is applicable to all economic structures.”) 
66  See, e.g, Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains 
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nevertheless a long-standing and deeply ingrained part of our tax system, and while the 
capital gains rate has varied a great deal since its inception, 67 it is unlikely that the 
preferential treatment of capital gains will be eliminated entirely in the near future.  
  
 
IV. APPLICATION OF TAX LAW TO VIRTUAL WORLDS 
 
 This Part explores potential applications of tax law to income generated by in-
world activity, focusing in particular on the capital-ordinary distinction.  Part IV.1 
discusses issues related to the taxation of income generated in virtual worlds and 
describes how a hypothetical tax regime that maintains the capital-ordinary distinction 




A. Virtual World Taxation 
 
 It seems clear that the definition of income in § 61 is broad enough to cover 
income generated by in-world activity, at the very least for users who trade virtual assets 
or currency for real money.  Among commentators there is no real disagreement that 
assets acquired in virtual worlds, once converted into dollars, will constitute taxable 
income.68  At present, most of the debate on the correct tax regime for this income has 
focused on timing and realization issues, specifically whether users should be taxed on 
in-world transactions, or if it would be preferable to wait until the moment their virtual 
property or money is converted into real money (a “cash-out” rule), and whether the 
answer should depend on the nature of the world.69  This is a complex question which has 
                                                                                                                                            
Preference, 48 Tax L. Rev. 319, 320 (1993) (arguing that “all arguments favoring the preference 
[are] wanting”); Daniel Halperin, A Capital Gains Preference is Not Even a Second-Best Solution, 
48 Tax L. Rev. 381, 381 (1993); John W. Lee, A Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains 
Contentions, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 1 (1995).  But see Daniel N. Shaviro, Uneasiness and Capital 
Gains, 48 Tax L. Rev. 393, 393 (1993) (arguing in favor of the preference).   
67  John W. Lee, III, The Capital Gains “Sieve” and the “Farce” of Progressivity 1921-
1986, 1 Hastings Bus. L.J. 1, 1 (2005) (describing the history of the capital gains preference). 
68  See, e.g., Camp, supra note 11, at 46 (“When US$ are received in exchange for an in-
world item or a promise to transfer an in-world item, the transaction is about as clear a realized 
accession to wealth as one can imagine.  It is a plain vanilla taxable transaction.”); Chodorow, 
supra note 2, at 696-97 (“A consensus exists for the proposition that anyone who ‘cashes out,’ or 
converts virtual wealth to real-world wealth, should be taxed on their gains.”). 
69  See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 11, at 1625 (arguing that in-world exchanges should 
never constitute realization events, but that in unstructured “intentionally commodified virtual 
worlds, such as Second Life” in-world sales for virtual world currency should be taxed, while a 
pure cash-out rule should apply to structured (“game”) worlds); Camp, supra note 11, at 2 
(arguing for a cash-out rule for all virtual worlds); Chodorow, supra note 2, at 743-45 (arguing 
that the I.R.S. should designate virtual worlds as “open” or “closed” based on the “world's rules 
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been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, and this Note does not address it. 
 Regardless of when the income is taxed, it will be necessary to decide the 
character of that income, that is, whether it is capital or ordinary.  There are three possible 
regimes:  all income generated by in-world activity could be taxed as ordinary income; all 
income generated in virtual worlds could be taxed as capital gains; or income generated 
by in-world activity could be taxed as either ordinary income or capital gains based on 
the nature of activity that produced the income.  While the reasons for preferring any one 
of these regimes to the others are complex, the first two options would be straightforward 
in application.  Therefore, I will only describe the third potential regime and the practical 
issues that would arise in its implementation. 
 As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to point out that the question of whether 
virtual objects can be considered property is highly contested and the subject of much 
discussion in scholarly literature on virtual worlds.70  Since that issue is outside the scope 
of this Note, I will not rehash the debate here, but merely identify its relevance to the 
matter at hand.  If items “owned” by an avatar in virtual worlds are not property, they 
cannot be capital assets under § 1221, and thus income derived from their sale or 
exchange cannot be capital gain.71  This Note is therefore premised on the assumption 
that virtual items can be considered property of the user, at least for the purposes of the 
tax code, though this should not be taken as a normative stance on how the virtual 
property question should be settled. 
 If the capital-ordinary distinction is maintained for in-world activity, it is likely 
that income from in-world activity would in most cases have the same character as 
income derived from analogous real world activity.  Thus, the income of users who 
exchange in-world services for money would be taxed at an ordinary rate, as would the 
income of users who have in-world businesses selling virtual goods.  A gold farmer who 
levels-up accounts and sells them would be taxed at an ordinary rate (since the accounts 
are “property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course 
of his trade or business,” therefore falling under the § 1221(a)(1) exception), while a user 
                                                                                                                                            
regarding the ability to buy and sell virtual assets outside the confines of the virtual space and the 
extent to which developers enforce those rules,” and that virtual wealth acquired in open worlds 
would be taxed if the taxpayer earns more than $600 in a given year); Theodore P. Seto, When Is 
a Game Only a Game?: The Taxation of Virtual Worlds, 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1027, 1030 (2009) 
(arguing that the tax regime that applies to a particular world should depend on the redeemability 
and exchangeability of its in-world currency); Steven Chung, Note, Real Taxation of Virtual 
Commerce, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 733, 735 (2009) (arguing that the currencies of some virtual worlds 
should be taxed under the foreign currency rules of the tax code). 
70  See, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1, 29-51 (2004) (describing property in virtual worlds and arguing that there are normative 
grounds for recognizing property rights in virtual objects); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 
85 B.U. L. Rev. 1047 (2005) (arguing for recognition of virtual property rights); Lederman, supra 
note 11, at 1631-41 (discussing virtual property issues in connection with taxation issues).  
71  However, note that §1221 is not always the end of the analysis in determining character.  
For example, taxpayers who enter into certain derivative contracts may get capital gains even 
when either party to the contract does not hold the underlying asset.  See infra Part IV.2.a for a 
more detailed discussion of derivatives. 
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who plays for several years and simply sells her account because she has tired of the 
game would be taxed at a capital gains rate.  Income from selling virtual world securities 
held for over a year would be taxed as capital gains, unless the seller is a dealer who buys 
and sells on behalf of other users.  For users who make their money in virtual real estate, 
the income of those who qualify as developers would be characterized as ordinary, while 
those who invest in real estate and later sell it would be able to benefit from capital gains 
treatment.72 
 However, there is another consideration which is specific to the virtual world 
context and further complicates the application of the capital-ordinary distinction:  under 
§ 1221(a)(3), artistic works created by the taxpayer, or received by the taxpayer as a gift 
from the creator or in an exchange with the creator, cannot be capital assets.  If the 
capital-ordinary distinction were maintained, this would create a bizarre regime for 
virtual worlds, in particular those like Second Life in which users can create almost 
anything they like.  Gain from sale of a virtual building created by the user would be 
taxed as ordinary income while gain from sale of a virtual building bought by the user 
would be capital gain, assuming it does not fall under any other § 1221 exception.  In 
addition, analyzing whether a virtual world object falls under the § 1221(a)(3) exception 
requires determining what exactly constitutes an artistic creation in a virtual world, which 
may be far from obvious.  It is unclear, for example, whether a customized avatar could 
be considered an artistic composition if the user did not create any of the components of 
the avatar herself.73 
 
 
                                                
72  The first Second Life millionaire, Anshe Chung, made her money primarily through 
virtual real estate development. Rob Hof, Second Life's First Millionaire, BusinessWeek.com, 
Nov. 26, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2006/11/second_lifes_fi.html (last 
visited July 11, 2009). 
73  The regulations provide some guidance on this issue but do not definitively answer it.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(3) (1960) (“For purposes of this paragraph, in general, property is 
created in whole or in part by the personal efforts of a taxpayer if such taxpayer performs literary, 
theatrical, musical, artistic, or other creative or productive work which affirmatively contributes 
to the creation of the property, or if such taxpayer directs and guides others in the performance of 
such work.”).  Since all that is required is that the taxpayer's efforts “affirmatively contribute[],” it 
is certainly possible that simply assembling an avatar could meet this standard, as long as the 
taxpayer's actions are considered “creative or productive.” 
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B. Policy Analysis74  
  
A tax policy is generally evaluated based on equity (whether the policy is fair), 
efficiency (whether it creates deadweight loss), and administrability (how feasible it is on 
a practical level).75  The equity concern can be subdivided into vertical and horizontal 
equity, with vertical referring to the normative position that those who have greater 
ability to pay should pay more tax and horizontal equity based on the concept that 
similarly situated taxpayers should be treated similarly.76  I will argue that applying the 
capital-ordinary distinction to in-world activity is 1) conceptually justified, 2) not clearly 
more inequitable than any other regime, 3) efficient, but 4) almost certainly impossible 
due to administrability concerns. 
 
 
1.   Conceptual Argument for Capital-Ordinary Distinction 
 
 Conceptually, whether to maintain the capital-ordinary distinction for in-world 
activity depends on how we understand in-world activity and its relationship to the real 
world.  Taxing all income generated from virtual world activity as ordinary income would 
be consistent with the “magic circle” vision of virtual worlds, which Camp describes as 
the idea that, “at an agreed place, time, and in an agreed manner, we can act without 
consequence to our ‘other’ life; we can separate what happens at the agreed place and 
time from the rest of our existence.”77  Under this theory, all income-generating in-world 
activity would be placed within the broad category of gaming activity, rendering it 
unnecessary to differentiate between the various types of activities that occur within the 
world.  A user who makes her money by investing in virtual land or securities and one 
who makes her money by providing services would both, ultimately, just be playing a 
game.  In-game investing, since it occurs in the magic circle, is therefore not equivalent 
                                                
74  Note that the following discussion focuses on transactions in which the taxpayer realizes 
a gain rather than a loss.  Of course, it is also possible that taxpayers may lose money in virtual 
worlds, in which case a different set of issues would be raised related to the deductibility of that 
loss.  Without delving too deeply into these issues, the main concern will likely be whether losses 
incurred in virtual worlds are deductible and, if so, to what extent.  Generally, ordinary losses are 
deductible as long as they were incurred in a trade or business or any transaction entered into for 
profit. I.R.C. § 165(c).  However, there are exceptions; income from gambling, for example, is 
ordinary, but losses from gambling are only deductible to the extent that they taxpayer had gains 
from gambling. I.R.C. § 165(d).  In contrast, capital losses are not fully deductible.  I.R.C. § 
1211. 
75  Lederman, supra note 11, at 1658-59. 
76  Id.  
77  Camp, supra note 11, at 60.  Camp applies the “magic circle” concept in a different 
context, and never addresses the question of the capital-ordinary distinction.  By using his 
definition of the term, I am not implying that the “magic circle” argument I discuss in this Note is 
one that he would endorse. 
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to real world investing.78  The closest analogy would probably be gambling in a casino.79  
Once a gambler has traded her money for chips, the I.R.S. does not care about each 
separate transaction she engages in but only how much money she has made or lost in the 
end.80  In contrast, maintaining the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income 
and applying it to in-world transactions would be consistent with the notion that there is 
no real difference, from an economic point of view, between virtual world and real world 
activity.  Virtual worlds, in this conception, are simply another setting in which economic 
transactions occur, but these transactions are not different or special because they occur in 
virtual worlds. 
 To illustrate these two theories of economic activity in virtual worlds, imagine 
two users, A and B (in, say, Second Life), who create two avatars:  A creates Mister 
Moneybags and B creates Mistress Sexysex.  User A's goal is to turn Mister Moneybags 
into a virtual investment tycoon, while User B hopes Mistress Sexysex will become a 
successful virtual prostitute.  Accordingly, Mister Moneybags researches Second Life 
companies, buys shares on a Second Life stock exchange, holds onto them for a while, 
and then later sells them if they have appreciated in value.  Mistress Sexysex, meanwhile, 
works on her cybersex skills, spends money upgrading her body and clothing, and tries to 
build her client base.  According to the “magic circle” theory, both A and B are simply 
playing roles in a game; the users controlling the avatars are not really, respectively, an 
investment tycoon and a prostitute.  In other legal contexts, we would not treat their 
activities as equivalent to their real world analogues, e.g., it would probably be 
impossible to prosecute User B for prostitution.81  Both Mister Moneybags and Mistress 
Sexysex are characters created to play out roles in an unreal world; thus the tax liability 
of their creators should not be dependent on what role they choose in that unreal world, 
but simply on their participation in the world. 
                                                
78  See id. at 62 (“Just as a virtual spoon is not really a spoon, neither is the market where 
virtual spoons are traded really a market for goods and services.  It’s a play-market, the virtual 
items within it are play-things used to enhance the value of the play, and the virtual currency 
which is the medium of exchange is play money.”). 
79  See id. at 64 (analogizing virtual world assets to casino chips).  
80  Note, however, that the treatment of gambling activity has not been entirely consistent.  
In some contexts, there can be no taxation until the chips are exchanged for cash.  But for online 
gambling, credits held in an online account, even if not cashed-out, will be taxed. See Olson, 
supra note 3, at 221 n.49. 
81  In fact, some statutes criminalizing prostitution could, if read literally, conceivably be 
construed broadly enough to cover User B’s conduct.  See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 230.00 (“A 
person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual 
conduct with another person in return for a fee.”).  However, it is extremely unlikely that User B's 
actions would fall under the category of “sexual conduct” since that statute is understood to 
reference the “the common understanding” of “prostitution.”  People v. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 
139, 141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).  Prostitution is commonly understood to require physical contact.  
However, this does not mean that User B’s actions as Mistress Sexysex could not on some level 
be considered “real.”  Many people would likely view User B as a kind of sex worker, something 
akin to a phone sex operator, particularly if she cashes out her virtual world earnings. 
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 While the magic circle may be a useful concept for understanding some aspects of 
virtual worlds, the above analysis, in my view, is unconvincing.  In terms of objective 
economic reality, there is no discernible boundary between transactions that occur in a 
virtual world and transactions that occur in the real world.  The magic circle argument 
may seem correct in the example above, but that is largely due to the subjective mindsets 
of the users who are primarily interested in roleplaying.  If, however, User A's end goal is 
not to roleplay an investment tycoon, or even to participate in a virtual world, but instead 
to simply make money through investment—if, in other words, he views his participation 
in Second Life as a wise investment decision rather than a leisure activity—the magic 
circle conception of virtual worlds starts to come apart.  User A becomes primarily an 
investor, someone who is only using the virtual world as a means to better his real world 
economic situation, not someone whose principal objective is to engage in role-playing in 
a virtual world.  Although a taxpayer's subjective motivation in undertaking an activity is 
not irrelevant to a determination of how the resulting income should be characterized, his 
motivation must be evidenced by objectively observable behavior.82  If a taxpayer earns 
income doing something, it is generally presumed that he intended to earn income.83  If a 
taxpayer's activities in a virtual world have an economic effect beyond the boundaries of 
that world, it should not matter whether or not the taxpayer's intent was to make real 
world money or to pretend to be an investment tycoon; it should be treated like any other 
economic transaction that occurs in any other setting. 
 In addition, the tax system is not, in other contexts, concerned with how “real” an 
asset is in determining the character of income.  As an illustration, we can look to the tax 
treatment of derivatives, specifically forward contracts.84  Say shares of Google are 
currently trading at $100, and two people, A and B, enter into a two-year forward contract 
for one share of Google at $140.  Under this contract, A has an obligation to sell to B, and 
                                                
82  See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416-21 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(declining to hold that the taxpayer’s “investment intent” is always irrelevant in the evaluation of 
whether property falls under the §1221(a)(1) exception, but setting forth guidelines which rely 
heavily on objective factors, such as “frequency and substantiality of sales” and 
“improvements”).  See generally Camp, supra note 11, at 61 n.242 (discussing intent in other 
areas of tax law). 
83  In the context of deductions, the tax code distinguishes between activity engaged in for 
profit and activity not engaged in for profit (for example, a hobby).  I.R.C. § 183(b) (when 
engaging in an activity not for profit, loss from that activity may be deducted only to offset gain 
generated by that activity).  This is of course a question of the taxpayer's subjective purpose, but 
there is a presumption that an activity is engaged in for profit, regardless of the taxpayer's actual 
motives, if his profits from the activity exceed his deductions for three years.  I.R.C. § 183(d). 
84  “A derivative is a bilateral contract or payment exchange agreement whose value is 
linked to, or derived from, an underlying asset (such as a currency, commodity or stock), 
reference rate (such as the Treasury Rate, the Federal Funds Rate or LIBOR), or index (such as 
the S&P 500).”  Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just “New Financial Bingo:” A Risk-Based 
Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. Corp. L. 1, 6 (1997).  “A forward contract requires 
one party to buy, and the other to sell, a designated quantity of the underlying at a pre-agreed 
price on some specified future date.” Id. at 9. 
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B an obligation to buy from A, one share of Google at $140 in two years.  In addition, 
since this is simply a contract between two parties who can agree to whatever they like, 
they determine in advance that no shares of Google will actually change hands, and 
instead the contract will be cash settled.  Thus, if Google is trading at $90 in two years, B 
(who would have bought at $140) simply pays A $50.  In addition, neither of them owns, 
nor at any point acquires, any actual shares of Google.  At the end of two years, the 
contract will be settled, and one party to the contract will have a capital gain, while the 
other will have a capital loss (unless Google is trading at $140, in which case neither will 
have gain nor loss).  Even though this forward contract is, in effect, a mere bet on the 
performance of Google shares, gain or loss derived from termination of a forward 
contract is treated as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset if the contract relates to 
“property which is (or on acquisition would be) a capital asset in the hands of the 
taxpayer.”85  For the purpose of determining character, it does not matter that the two 
parties have only “pretended” to sell an asset owned by neither of them.86 
 The tax treatment of forward contracts is arguably an inapt analogy in that a share 
of Google (whether or not actually owned by either party) might be said to truly exist in a 
way that a share of a virtual company does not, although that is certainly debatable.87  
However, the comparison becomes more exact if we consider that real world forward 
contracts could conceivably refer to the stock price of virtual world companies, since the 
asset underlying a derivative contract can be almost anything.88  The two parties to a 
forward contract based on the price of a virtual world stock need not be virtual world 
users themselves, and they could cash settle the contract without ever acquiring a share of 
the virtual world company.  This forward contract would be as real as any other forward 
contract.  To determine the character of gain or loss, the inquiry would be 
straightforward:  if a share of a virtual world company were a capital asset, any gain or 
loss on the contract would be capital.  If we compare this real world forward contract, 
between two parties who do not participate in a virtual world, with a “virtual” forward 
contract between two users acting through their avatars,89 the illogic of taxing these two 
transactions differently becomes more obvious.  Assuming for the moment that a virtual 
                                                
85  I.R.C. § 1234A.   
86  However, note that the tax treatment of derivatives is highly inconsistent.  The rules that 
apply to forward contracts do not apply to all derivatives, and so a different derivative might be 
taxed differently, even it if produces the same economic result as the forward contract here.  See 
David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities, an Agenda for Reform, 104 
Colum. L. Rev. 1886, 1895-96 (2004). 
87  See generally Thompson, supra note 43 at 95 (discussing whether virtual stocks can be 
considered securities for the purpose of securities laws). 
88  Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 Colum. 
Bus. L. Rev. 681, 681 (2002) (“Underlyings can be anything that interests markets.”).  
89  The idea of avatars entering into derivative contracts potentially raises a host of other 
legal issues, since, among other things, there are restrictions on who can enter into a derivative 
contract.  These issues will not be discussed further here. 
Vol. XI               The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review                   2010 
 
 170 
world stock is a capital asset, the magic circle concept leads to the conclusion that two 
people engaging the same economic activity—i.e., betting on the performance of a virtual 
world company—would be subject to different tax treatment, simply because one is 
acting in a virtual world, and the other is not.  To push this example even further, a virtual 
world user who actually acquires and sells virtual stock would be taxed at an ordinary 
rate, while a party to a real world derivative contract based on virtual stock could be 
taxed at a capital rate without ever acquiring any stock.  To many, this would seem an 
absurd result.  The broader point is that there is no clear line between those who are 
simply playing a game and those who are actually investing, and, from a conceptual point 
of view, tax law should not attempt to draw such a line. 
  
 
2.   Equity 
 
 For a tax to be horizontally equitable, “similarly situated” taxpayers should bear 
the same tax burden.  In the context of virtual worlds, any analysis of horizontal equity 
will be related to the conceptual argument set forth above because how we conceive of 
users in virtual worlds determines whom we think of as similarly situated.  In the Mister 
Moneybags and Mistress Sexysex example, it would seem inequitable to tax User A at a 
lower rate than User B if we see them both as taxpayers who have made money through 
their participation in Second Life (all virtual world users are similarly situated).  In 
contrast, if all virtual world income is taxed as ordinary income, and we see User A as 
someone who has made money through investment, it would be unfair to tax him at a 
higher rate than other investors (all investors are similarly situated).  If all virtual world 
income were taxed as capital gains, this would arguably be unfair to taxpayers who make 
money from non-investment activity outside of virtual worlds, who would be taxed at a 
higher rate than taxpayers engaging in equivalent activity in virtual worlds.   
  The counterargument to the second two examples is that people have a choice of 
whether or not to participate in virtual worlds, so it would not be unfair to tax User A at 
an ordinary rate, even if he is an investor, because he could always choose to invest in the 
real world rather than a virtual world.  Similarly, if all virtual world income is taxed as 
capital gains, the opportunity to join and make money in a virtual world is open to those 
who want to benefit from the favorable tax rate. 
 A further horizontal equity issue is raised by the § 1221(a)(3) exception.  As 
discussed above, gain from sale of artistic works created by the taxpayer, or received by 
the taxpayer as a gift from or in an exchange will be ordinary income.  This means that 
users who sell objects that they create themselves would be taxed at a higher rate than 
those who buy the same objects.  While this is obviously also true of real world artistic 
creations—gain from a painting sold by the painter will not have the same character as 
gain from the sale of the same painting by a person who bought it—the difference is that 
in certain virtual worlds, such as Second Life, almost everything in the world is user-
created, meaning that the exception would apply far more broadly than it does in the real 
world.  It is therefore necessary to consider whether it is correct to view a creator who 
makes virtual world items and one who makes real world art as similarly situated, or 
whether the in-world differentiation between those who buy assets and those who create 
them is too absurd to be supported. 
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 The greatest vertical equity concern would arise under a regime that treats all 
income generated in virtual worlds as capital gains.  The argument that people can always 
choose to make money in virtual worlds seems less convincing given that participation in 
a virtual world requires a computer powerful enough and an internet connection fast 
enough to access and run the virtual world, and, in many virtual worlds, the payment of 
subscription fees.  This means that the lower tax rate for non-investment activity would 
not be available to those who have less, rather than more, ability to pay, which may seem 
particularly unjust.  However, these vertical equity concerns are not unique to the virtual 
world context, but rather are inherent in the capital gains preference.  It is the wealthiest 
taxpayers who benefit most from the capital gains preference, both because they have the 
most wealth to invest, and because they are subject to higher ordinary income tax rates.90 
 Given that the existence of the ordinary-capital distinction is arguably inequitable, 
and given the complexities of applying the tax code to virtual worlds, there does not seem 
to be a clear answer to the question of which regime would be least inequitable.  
However, taxing all income as capital gains would likely create the most inequity because 
it would grant preferential tax treatment to anyone who makes money in a virtual world, 




3.   Efficiency 
 
 In the context of tax policy, efficiency is generally evaluated by an inquiry into 
how a tax distorts economic behavior; the less distortion it creates, the more efficient the 
tax.91  To illustrate this concept, imagine that a special sales tax were suddenly imposed 
on all crayons.  Since the price to consumers would increase, some of those who would 
normally prefer to buy crayons would substitute another product, such as magic markers 
or colored pencils.  To the extent that the tax has induced consumers to alter their crayon-
buying behavior, it is inefficient.   In assessing efficiency for the purposes of the current 
discussion, it is important to note that the tax system as a whole already creates economic 
distortion, and the existence of the capital gains preference is inefficient in that it creates 
an incentive to engage in activities that will produce capital gains rather than ordinary 
income.92  The question of how virtual world income should be taxed must be considered 
in that context; because any tax regime will be distortionary, the least inefficient regime is 
one that does not add any new distortions.  It is therefore useful to compare the likely 
effects of a tax regime in which the ordinary-capital distinction is maintained in virtual 
                                                
90  Lee, supra note 67, at 3.  
91  Eric Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 Va. Tax Rev. 39, 43 (1996) 
(“Efficiency could mean and traditionally has meant taxing to minimize the economic distortions 
that result from any taxes . . . .”). 
92  It is often observed that “[a]ll taxes cause economic distortion.” Id. at 45.  In fact, the 
capital gains preference both creates economic distortions and arguably mitigates other 
distortions created by the tax system.  See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains 
Taxation: What’s Law Got to Do With It?, 39 Sw. L. J. 869, 869 n.3 (1985). 
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worlds with one in which all income is characterized as capital and one in which all 
income is characterized as ordinary.93  In this analysis, I focus on users who participate in 
virtual worlds primarily to make money because I assume that they will be more sensitive 
to the tax regime than users who participate in virtual worlds for entertainment.  While 
pleasure-motivated users might alter their behavior in response to economic incentives, 
their reaction would likely be less significant than profit-motivated users. 
 If the capital-ordinary distinction is maintained, there will be no new incentive or 
disincentive for profit-motivated users (or potential users) to participate in virtual worlds.  
Investors will be taxed as they are for real world transactions, as will those who provide 
services or have a business selling goods.  Their decision to participate in virtual worlds 
will thus not be based on minimization of tax liability.  Any inefficiency that results from 
the tax incentive for investment arises from the capital gains preference itself and is not a 
problem particular to virtual worlds.  Maintaining the distinction will likely not create 
any new distortions in economic behavior, and thus it will not make the system as a 
whole any more inefficient.   
 If all income is treated as capital gains, the tax regime will create an incentive to 
do business in virtual worlds, because people earning money from in-world businesses 
will be taxed at the lower capital gains rate, while people who earn money from real 
world businesses will continue to be taxed at the higher ordinary rate.  Economic 
distortion results because the decreased tax burden will motivate more people to do 
business in virtual worlds.  In addition to the inefficiency, this may be a concern in that 
virtual world businesses are, arguably, less socially valuable than real world businesses, 
and it is especially problematic in encouraging grey market behaviors, such as gold 
farming, which many consider unsavory or unethical.94  Another troubling consequence is 
that people might move their real world businesses to virtual worlds in order to decrease 
their tax burden.  Lawyers could easily provide legal advice through avatars in a virtual 
world; under an all-capital regime, this would be an attractive possibility. 
 If, instead, all income is treated as ordinary income, virtual world investment will 
become less attractive, because it will be taxed at a higher rate than real world 
investment.  This would also create distortion because those who want to invest in virtual 
worlds will be less likely to do so.  Currently, this would only affect users whose virtual 
world income could potentially be characterized as capital gains since all other users 
would already be taxed at the ordinary rate.  Because there are no reliable statistics on the 
number of users who engage in particular in-world activities, it is difficult to know 
exactly how many users would have an increased tax burden as a result of an all-ordinary 
                                                
93  Note that another possible way of thinking about this question is by considering how 
behavior would be distorted by the transition from the current state of affairs, in which the tax 
regime that applies to virtual worlds is highly uncertain, to a world in which one of these regimes 
is clearly applied and enforced, but this Note does not address these transitional distortions. 
94  See Raut & Schrader, supra note 36 (describing objections to gold farming); see also 
Michael Risch, Virtual Third Parties, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 415, 417 
(2009) (describing a class action suit against an alleged gold farmer whose activities “allegedly 
depleted available virtual gold and devalued virtual currency for third-party users, causing real 
world loss of use of the system, lost time spent prospecting virtual resources, and computer speed 
degradation.”).  
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regime.  However, given that many virtual world activities would fall under the § 
1221(a)(1) or (a)(3) exception,95 it seems reasonable to assume that, at the moment, only 
a small proportion of virtual world income could potentially be characterized as capital 
gains. 
However, even if only a small number of current users would be affected, that is 
not the end of the analysis because an all-ordinary regime could also affect the future 
economic development of virtual worlds.  Although in-world investing might not be 
common now, it may become more prevalent in the future; an all-ordinary regime may 
prevent that from happening.   
 Maintaining the capital-ordinary distinction would therefore be the best regime 
from an efficiency point of view in that it would create the least distortion.  Treating all 
income as ordinary would, in the short term, likely affect only a relatively small subset of 
users who are in-world investors, although it may also create distortions in how virtual 
world economies develop.  Treating all income as capital would create the most distortion 
because it would lower the tax burden of most users and also potentially encourage a 
large number of people to earn income in virtual worlds. 
 
 
4.   Administrability 
 
 Although I maintain that importing the capital-ordinary distinction to virtual 
world activity is conceptually correct, it would nevertheless be a bad idea because it 
would lead to vast administrative complexity and be effectively impossible to enforce.  
Although it may not seem optimal that this one concern should be able to trump all 
others, the I.R.S. has regularly made decisions based on administrability alone, even 
when the result is conceptually incorrect.96  A tax regime that cannot be carried out in 
practice is worthless. 
 It is assumed that some taxpayers will lie if it lowers their tax liability and if they 
are likely to get away with it.97  Therefore, if income from virtual worlds can be ordinary 
or capital depending on the activity within the world, it is probable that a number of 
                                                
95  See supra Part IV.1 (discussing how the capital-ordinary distinction would apply to 
different virtual world activities). 
96  One much-discussed example was the decision not to include as income frequent flier 
miles acquired as a result of taxpayers' business travel, even though they arguably fall within the 
broad definition of income.  The decision was based on political and administrative concerns 
rather than conceptual accuracy.  See Camp, supra note 11, at 27-28 (discussing practical reasons 
underlying the decision not to tax frequent flier miles).  For an argument as to why frequent flier 
miles should be included as income, see Dominic L. Daher, The Proposed Federal Taxation of 
Frequent Flier Miles Received From Employers: Good Tax Policy but Bad Politics, 16 Akron Tax 
J. 1, 1 (2001). 
97  See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax 
Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1463-65 (2003) (describing an economic model which 
predicts a rational taxpayer will decide whether to evade tax based on the probability of detection 
and the penalty for noncompliance). 
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virtual world users will report ordinary income as capital gains and capital losses as 
ordinary, because their risk of getting caught is insignificant.  While the I.R.S. might 
audit a few virtual world users who make a great deal of money, it is highly unlikely that 
a significant proportion of users would ever face scrutiny.98  An audit of in-world activity 
would in all likelihood be extremely burdensome for the I.R.S.  In order to establish the 
accuracy of a taxpayer's declaration, the I.R.S. would have to determine, among other 
things, whether a virtual world asset is an “artistic composition” and, if so, whether the 
taxpayer created it himself (and, if not, how he acquired it), whether the taxpayer has a 
trade or business in selling such assets, and whether, if the sale is of virtual real estate, the 
taxpayer is more properly classified as a developer of virtual real estate, or an investor in 
virtual real estate.  While the I.R.S. has to make the same determinations about real world 
transactions, the nature of real world transactions is far more easily ascertainable than the 
nature of virtual world transactions. 
 Furthermore, it is unclear exactly how the I.R.S. would audit a taxpayer who 
derives income from virtual world activity.  It might be necessary for the auditors to 
create their own avatars to track the taxpayer's avatar, but that strategy would be 
impractical, particularly if the taxpayer has become inactive in that world or has simply 
stopped using that particular avatar.  Another possible solution would be to require the 
owners of the virtual worlds to track and report virtual transactions, but, given the 
number of these transactions, that would impose an immense burden that would 
effectively be impossible to meet.99 
 It would therefore be more administratively convenient to characterize all virtual 
world income as either ordinary income or capital gains without an inquiry into the nature 
of the specific activity that produced the income.  Given the equity and efficiency 
concerns discussed above, it would seem that, of these two possibilities, it would be 





 The economic activity occurring in virtual worlds is not confined to those worlds 
but instead often results in the realization of real world income, raising a host of difficult 
and perplexing tax issues.  Rather than focusing on the question of when wealth 
accumulated in virtual worlds should be taxed, this Note has started from the assumption 
that it will be taxed at some point, and then turned to the next logical question:  how 
should the character of this income be determined?  I have reached two contradictory 
conclusions.  First, that as a conceptual matter, the capital-ordinary determination should 
be made the same way it is for real world income, that is, based on the activity which 
produced the income.  Second, that administrative concerns should override any 
                                                
98  See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the 
Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 583-84 (2006) (describing the audit selection 
formulas, which make it more likely that the I.R.S. will conduct an audit where the “the 
magnitude of potential audit adjustments” is greater); Lederman, supra note 11, at 1660.  
99  Lederman, supra note 11, at 1661. 
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argument for applying the capital-ordinary distinction to in-world activity.   
 Considered in the abstract, the question of whether to tax in-world activity in the 
same way that analogous real world activity is taxed boils down to an inquiry into how 
we understand the nature of in-world activity.  If virtual worlds are considered to be no 
more than games, and all activity within them a kind of play, it plausibly follows that we 
should not distinguish between the different forms of play in which users engage.  The 
problem with this argument is that it assumes that participants in virtual worlds are 
motivated by their desire to play a game, and not by their desire to earn money.  That 
assumption does not reflect reality, since at least some users participate in virtual worlds 
for profit rather than pleasure.  Furthermore, it is illogical to simply assume that a 
taxpayer who earned income through an activity was not motivated by a desire to earn 
money.  Similarly, any argument that in-world activity should be taxed differently 
because it is less real than real world activity is problematic.  The tax treatment of 
forward contracts shows that when these contracts make reference to a capital asset, the 
character of the resulting income is capital even when neither of the parties to the 
contract actually owned that asset; in other words, it makes no difference whether the 
underlying transaction was “real” or not.  Taxing in-world and real world transactions 
differently also raises the possibility that exactly the same transaction, with exactly the 
same economic outcome, might be taxed differently depending on whether the two 
parties were acting in the real world or in a virtual world. 
 In addition, other policy considerations also weigh in favor of maintaining the 
capital-ordinary distinction.  Because it would neither create an incentive nor a 
disincentive to make money in a virtual world, thus causing a minimum of economic 
distortion, applying the distinction to virtual world activity would likely be the most 
efficient regime.  The equity analysis is less clear, because the existence of the distinction 
in any context may be inherently inequitable.  However, maintaining the distinction 
would probably not add much inequity to the existing system, and it would certainly be 
preferable to characterizing all virtual world income as capital gains. 
 Nevertheless, the conceptually correct result is not necessarily the best regime, 
because it is necessary to take into account the practical concern of administrability and 
particularly enforceability.  Since it is effectively impossible to accurately determine the 
nature of the in-world income-generating activity, the I.R.S. would likely have to depend 
on taxpayer self-reporting.  Therefore, allowing a preferential capital gains rate for some 
in-world transactions would predictably result in a great deal of mischaracterization of 
ordinary income as capital gains, and capital losses as ordinary losses.  In order to avoid 
this result, the I.R.S. should characterize all virtual world income as ordinary income. 
 
